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This paper incorporates a global bank into a two-country business cycle model. The bank 
collects deposits from households and makes loans to entrepreneurs, in both countries. It 
has to finance a fraction of loans using equity. We investigate how such a bank capital 
requirement affects the international transmission of productivity and loan default shocks. 
Three findings emerge. First, the bank's capital requirement has little effect on the 
international transmission of productivity shocks. Second, the contribution of loan default 
shocks to business cycle fluctuations is negligible under normal economic conditions. Third, 
an exceptionally large loan loss originating in one country induces a sizeable and 
simultaneous decline in economic activity in both countries. This is particularly noteworthy, 
as the 2007-09 global financial crisis was characterized by large credit losses in the US and a 
simultaneous sharp output reduction in the US and the Euro Area. Our results thus suggest 
that global banks may have played an important role in the international transmission of the 
crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
During the recent (2007-2009) financial crisis, economic activity collapsed 
simultaneously in the United States and in the Euro Area (EA). This is striking as, 
typically, the US business cycle leads the EA business cycle. Several indicators suggest 
that the crisis was triggered by specific developments in the US. House price indices, for 
instance, started to plummet by mid-2006 in the US, but have been holding up well in the 
EA (ECB, 2010). In addition, while both US and EA banks suffered large loan losses, 
almost all losses experienced by US banks were due to domestic loans, whereas the credit 
losses of EA banks were largely due to foreign (US) loans (IMF, 2010). This paper 
assesses under what circumstances country-specific shocks trigger a sharp and highly 
synchronized international downturn. 
  We address this issue, using a quantitative international business cycle model. 
While standard macro models developed before the global financial crisis mostly 
abstracted from financial intermediaries, our model features a globally integrated banking 
sector.
1 This allows us to account for financial factors in international economic 
fluctuations. Our model represents a two-country world, where each country is inhabited 
by a worker and an entrepreneur. The worker provides labor to the local entrepreneur and 
deposit savings at a globally operating bank, which lends to entrepreneurs in both 
countries. Entrepreneurs accumulate capital and produce a homogenous tradable good 
using capital and labor. 
  We focus on the role of bank capital for the international transmission of 
macroeconomic and financial shocks. In order to do so, we maintain an aggregate 
perspective and assume a representative bank, i.e., we abstract from the interbank market, 
where liquidity shortages can emerge as an additional friction in financial 
intermediation.
2 Specifically, we assume that the bank has to finance a fraction of the 
loans using its own funds (equity). We are agnostic as to whether this constraint reflects 
regulatory requirements or, more broadly, market pressures.
3  
  In equilibrium, the loan rate exceeds the deposit rate; and the interest spread is a 
decreasing function of the bank's 'excess' capital, i.e., of bank capital held in excess of the  
target level. We assume exogenous fluctuations in productivity and loan default rates, and  
calibrate the model to US and EA data. Considering the period 1995-2010, we show that  
the model is able account for key features of economic fluctuations, including the co-
movement of macroeconomic aggregates across the US and the EA, as well as the behavior  
                                                 
1 Krugman and Obstfeld (2008) point out that ‘one of the most pervasive features of today’s banking 
industry is that banking activities have become globalized.’ The growing international orientation of US 
banks is, e.g., documented in Acharya and Schnabl (2009), and in Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) who 
report that global US banks (banks with positive assets from foreign offices) held 70% of US banking 
system assets in 2005 (the share of assets from foreign offices within total assets of US global banks 
exceeded 20% in 2005). External assets and liabilities of US banks (each) represented about 30% of US 
GDP at the end of September 2009; for Germany, France and the UK, external bank assets and liabilities 
represent more than 100% of domestic GDP (BIS, 2010).  
2 Disruptions in the interbank market played an important role in the early stages of the global financial 
crisis (Brunnermeier (2009)); see Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) for a formal treatment of the interbank market.  
3 Traditionally, regulating banks' capital is often justified by limiting moral hazard in the presence of 
informational frictions and deposit insurance, see Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). In the present paper we 
abstract from these issues. Our focus, instead, is on the business cycle implications of bank capital 
requirements, which we take as given. Finally, we note that our representative global bank may be thought 
of in more general terms as the global financial sector. “Shadow banks” and other financial institutions too 
are key players in world financial markets. Yet net worth is an important determinant for all of these actors, 
whether they are officially classified as “banks” or not.   3
of financial variables such as loan and deposit volumes, and loan-deposit interest rate 
spreads. Model simulations show that the bank capital requirement is of little consequence 
for the international transmission of technology shocks. Moreover, country-specific 
technology shocks do not generate synchronized international output fluctuations in the 
set-up here, consistent with similar findings for conventional multi-country models (e.g., 
Backus et al. 1992). Our model simulations suggest that the contribution of loan default 
shocks to business cycle fluctuations is negligible under normal economic conditions. 
However, the calibrated model predicts that an exceptionally big credit loss in one country, 
of the magnitude seen in the US during the 2007-2009 recession, triggers a large and 
persistent decline in domestic and foreign output, by about 2% on impact. To understand 
this result, note that a loan loss reduces the global bank’s capital; due to the bank capital 
constraint, this raises domestic and  foreign loan spreads, thus lowering lending, 
investment and output in both countries.
4 By contrast, a loan loss shock has virtually no 
effect on loan spreads and output, in model variants without a bank capital requirement.  
    The closed economy macro literature has only recently started to develop 
quantitative dynamic models with banks; see Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) for an 
early contribution. Aikman and Paustian (2006), Van den Heuvel (2008), de Walque et 
al. (2009), Angeloni and Faia (2009) and von Peter (2009) use closed economy general 
equilibrium models to analyze the macroeconomic implications of bank capital 
requirements. Cúrdia and Woodford (2009), Roeger (2009), Dib (2010), Gerali et al. 
(2010) and Meh and Moran (2010) embed banks in fairly rich, but closed economy 
DSGE models. Gerali et al. (op.cit.) estimate their model on time-series data for the EA 
and find that shocks to bank capital may have sizeable effects on economic activity. Our 
paper has been written independently of a complementary study by Iacoviello (2010) who 
presents a closed economy model in which banks, as well as entrepreneurs and impatient 
households face collateral constraints. He shows that a loan default by impatient 
households may trigger a sizeable recession, if the bank faces a capital requirement.  
  International business cycle models have likewise largely abstracted from banks. 
An exception is Olivero (2010) who studied the implications of a global, imperfectly 
competitive banking sector for international co-movements; in her analysis, banks do not 
face a capital requirement. Some recent open-economy studies consider a range of 
financial factors in order to explain the recent global recession. Mendoza and Quadrini 
(2010) simultaneously analyze financial globalization and spillovers of country-specific 
shocks to bank capital. In their two-country model, countries are characterized by 
different stages of financial development, determining the extent to which households can 
insure themselves against idiosyncratic income risk; in contrast to our paper, these 
authors do not study business cycles, as they assume that aggregate capital and 
production are constant.
5 In a related contribution, Devereux and Yetman (2010) abstract 
from capital accumulation, banks, and financial shocks, but focus on the international 
transmission of productivity shocks in the presence of international portfolio holdings by 
                                                 
4 This mechanism is consistent with empirical results by Puri et al. (2010) who show, using German data 
for 2006-08, that lending was reduced by those retails banks which were particularly exposed to loan losses 
in the US. Similarly, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) identify international banking linkages as a determinant 
of a reduction in loan supply in emerging market economies after 2007. Our model assumes that a generic 
entrepreneur in each country borrows from the global bank, and (partially) defaults on bank loans. As our 
focus is on the international transmission of default shocks, we do not provide a detailed analysis of their 
origins, which arguably would require an explicit model of the housing sector (see Iacoviello (2010)). 
5 After the present research was completed, several quantitative two-country DSGE models with banks 
were brought to our attention: Correa et al. (2010), Davis (2010) and Ueda (2010); these authors do not 
consider the international transmission channel (via a bank capital requirement) discussed here.    4
leverage-constrained investors; these authors find that, under a high level of financial 
integration, binding leverage constraints may induce a strong degree of cross-country 
output co-movement. Finally, Dedola and Lombardo (2010) and Perri and Quadrini (2010) 
model financial frictions by assuming that firms face borrowing constraints, as debt 
contracts are imperfectly enforceable; in their settings, a country-specific 'credit shock' 
(tightening of borrowing constraint), may lead to a decline in global economic activity.  
  Against this background, our contribution is to show how a country-specific loan 
loss triggers a worldwide recession in the presence of a global bank that faces a capital 
requirement. We do so within a quantitative business cycle model which captures key 
features of actual time-series data. However, in order to illustrate the underlying 
mechanism as transparently as possible, our analysis abstracts from various frictions 
which are often considered within larger DSGE models; in particular, we assume that 
only the bank faces a collateral constraint.
 6 Our paper is therefore not meant to provide a 
complete quantitative account of the global financial crisis. Instead, it is complementary 
to the studies discussed above. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data 
which motivate our investigation. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 presents the 
quantitative results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Properties of US and EA macroeconomic data 
Our goal is to account for key features of US and EA business cycles. Figure 1 shows HP 
filtered quarterly log real GDP, and demeaned year-on-year (yoy) GDP growth rates, for 
the US (solid lines) and EA (dashed lines). The sample period is 1975q1-2010q1. (See 
Appendix for data definitions and sources.) Shaded areas indicate US recessions 
(according to the NBER). Figure 1 shows that the US cycle has tended to lead the 
European cycle by a few quarters--with the exception of the latest recession during which 
output collapsed simultaneously in the US and the EA (see Giannone et al. (2010) for 
detailed analyses of US-EA macro linkages). We argue below that this key feature of the 
2007-2009 recession might be due to a credit loss shock to the globalized financial sector. 
  Figure 2 illustrates important financial aspects of the 2007-2009 recession.
7 The 
upper left panel shows quarterly time series for loan loss rates of US banks, and of German 
banks (taken as a proxy for loan loss rates of EA banks, as aggregate EA loan loss data 
are not available). The loss rates are expressed as annualized percentages of outstanding 
stocks of loans. The Figure shows that loan loss rates have reached unprecedented levels 
in 2007-2009. Note that the increase in loss rates was larger for US banks. 
  According to estimates by the IMF (2010), the total worldwide bank writedowns 
on loans and securities during 2007-2009 amounted to 2,300 billion USD with about 70% 
due to loan losses. US and EA banks faced loan losses totaling 588 billion and 440 
billion, respectively, according to the IMF estimates. (The ECB has conducted 
independent calculations, and reports similar figures; see ECB, 2010.)  Importantly, 
losses on foreign loans account for less than 10% of the total loan losses experienced by 
US banks, while losses on foreign loans represent 60% of the credit losses of EA banks. 
The total credit losses of US banks represent about 4% of annual US GDP (14 trillion 
USD in 2007). Under the plausible assumption that a substantial share of the foreign loan 
losses of EA banks represents losses originating in the US, the total credit losses 
                                                 
6 Our analysis abstracts from of other issues which may also have played a quantitatively important role, in 
2007-2009. Examples are oil and commodity price changes, and the zero lower bound (on the nominal 
interest rate) which constrained monetary policy.  
7 Figure 2 plots data for 1995q1-2010q1 (shorter sample, due to lack of earlier synthetic EA data).   5
originating in the US amount to about 5% of annual US GDP. Below we explore the 
consequences of a 'loan-default shock' of this size in our quantitative model. 
  The upper right panel of Figure 2 plots time series for the ratio of bank capital to 
bank assets, i.e. the ‘bank capital ratio’, for the US (solid line) and the EA (dashed line), 
based on accounting measures of bank equity.
8 The bank capital ratios held up fairly well 
during the recent crisis—but it has been argued that this may partly reflect accounting 
discretion which has allowed banks to overstate the value of their assets in the crisis (e.g., 
Huizinga and Laeven 2009). Figure 2 therefore also plots time series for market prices of 
US and EA bank equity (Dow Jones bank index; Stoxx Europe 600 Banks); those prices 
have dropped sharply during the global recession--much more sharply than broad stock 
market indices (S&P 500; Stoxx Europe). Interestingly, US and EA bank stocks started to 
decline before the overall market. (All stock indices in Figure 2 are normalized to 100 in 
2009q1.). This pronounced and early relative fall in bank stocks distinguishes the current 
recession from other post-war recessions—and suggests that banking problems were a 
key aspect of the global recession. 
  Finally, Figure 2 also plots real loan growth rates (year-on-year), and bank 
lending rate spreads (in % per annum), for the US and the EA. At the beginning of the 
global recession, loan growth was still positive, but declined substantially towards the 
end of the recession; by mid-2009 aggregate US and EA lending contracted sharply. US 
and EA lending rate spreads started to rise strongly in late 2008.
9 
  Below, we will assess whether our model matches US and EA business cycles, as 
described by second moments of HP filtered quarterly macroeconomic data. Table 1 
reports key business cycle statistics for 1995q1-2010q1. The first two columns of the 
Table report standard deviations for output, consumption, investment, employment, 
deposits, loans, and the loan rate spread, both for the US and the EA. The other columns 
report correlations with domestic output, and correlations between US and EA variables. 
Table 1 confirms the well known fact (e.g., King and Rebelo, 1999) that consumption and 
employment are less volatile than GDP, while investment is more volatile. Deposits are 
somewhat less volatile than GDP, while loans are more volatile. The loan spread is 
roughly 20%-30% as volatile as (detrended) GDP. Empirically, investment and 
consumption are highly procyclical. This holds for loans as well, while loan spreads are 
countercyclical. EA deposits are acyclical. US deposits appear to be countercyclical, but 
this finding is not robust with respect to the sample period—in a longer sample (1975-
2010) US deposits are weakly procyclical. All variables considered here exhibit strong 
cross-country correlations. Interestingly, in our sample the cross-country correlation of 
output is somewhat lower than that of consumption and investment.  
 
3. The Model 
We consider a world with two countries, called Home and Foreign. In each country there 
is a representative worker and an entrepreneur. In addition there is a representative global 
bank. All agents are infinitely lived. The bank collects deposits from Home and Foreign 
workers, and makes loans to Home and Foreign entrepreneurs. There is a final good, 
produced by Home and Foreign entrepreneurs using local labor and capital. The good can 
                                                 
8 Note that we divide bank equity by total assets, and not by risk-weighted assets. The capital ratio of US 
banks is larger than that of EA banks, which reflect differences in the risk structure of US and EA banks’ 
assets, and in accounting standards. (We thank Skander Van den Heuvel for advice on these issues.) 
9 We measure spreads as difference between bank loan rates and money market rates. We view this as a 
proxy for spreads between loan rates and deposit rates (there are no time series for US deposit rates).   6
be traded freely. It is used for consumption by all agents, and for capital accumulation by 
entrepreneurs. All markets are competitive. 
  Our analysis centers on the role of a bank capital requirement for the transmission 
of shocks. We model that capital requirement as a flexible collateral constraint faced by 
the global bank--it bears a resource cost when deposits fall below a fraction of the bank 
assets. In order to focus sharply on the effect of this constraint, we assume that workers 
and entrepreneurs do not face collateral constraints.
10 
  Preferences and technologies have the same structure in both countries. The 
following exposition thus focuses on the Home country. Foreign variables are denoted by 
an asterisk. 
 
3.1. Agents and Markets 
The Home worker 
The Home worker consumes the final good, provides labor to the Home entrepreneur and 
invests her savings in one-period bank deposits. Her date t budget constraint is: 
                                                   1
D
tt t tt t CD W ND R + += + ,                                              (1) 
where  t C  and  t W  are her consumption and the wage rate, respectively (the final good is 
used as numéraire).  t N  are hours worked.  1 t D +  is the bank deposit held by the Home 
worker at the end of period t. 
D
t R  is the gross interest rate on deposits, between t-1 and t 
(
D
t R  is set at t-1). The Home worker’s expected life-time utility at date t is:  
                               1 0 [( ) ( ) ]
sD N
tt s t s t s s Eu C u D N β
∞
++ + + = +Ψ ⋅ −Ψ ⋅ ∑ ,                           (2) 
where  ,0
DN ΨΨ >  are parameters. 
1 () ( 1 ) / ( 1 ) ux x
σ σ
− = −−  with  0 σ >   is an increasing and 
concave function (when  1, σ=  w e  s e t   () l n () ux x = ). 0 1 β < <  is a subjective discount factor. 
Workers, entrepreneurs and the banker have the same subjective discount factor. Note 
that we assume that deposits provide utility to the worker (liquidity services). This allows 
us to calibrate the model in such a way that, in steady state, the deposit rate is smaller 
than the lending rate, and that workers hold deposits while entrepreneurs borrow.
11 An 
alternative setup consistent with a positive loan spread and positive deposits is that 
workers are more patient than entrepreneurs and the banker. Such a setup allows to 
dispense with the assumption that deposits provide liquidity services; it delivers very 
similar results as the ‘deposits-in-utility’ framework discussed here.   
    The Home worker maximizes (2) subject to the period-by-budget constraint (1). 
Ruling out Ponzi schemes, that decision problem has these first-order conditions:  
                   11 1 '( )/ '( ) '( )/ '( ) 1
DD
tt t t t t R E uC uC uD uC β ++ + + Ψ= ,     '( )
N
tt uCW=Ψ .                                                
 
The Home entrepreneur 
The Home entrepreneur accumulates physical capital and uses capital and local labor to 
produce the final good. Home final good output, denoted , t Z  is produced using the Cobb- 
                                                 
10 Our structure thus differs from models with financial frictions in the tradition of Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997). In those models there are no financial intermediaries; entrepreneurs are less patient than workers, 
and face a collateral constraint for debt, which ensures existence of a stationary equilibrium.  
11 For simplicity, we assume that the (sub-)utility functions of consumption and deposits have the same 
CRRA form. This follows the typical ‘money-in-the-utility-function’ specifications used in the macro 
literature (deposits represent ‘money’ in our model); e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), p.661. Our results 
do not hinge on this assumption (see below).    7
Douglas technology
1 () (), ttt t ZK N
α α θ
− = with  01 . α < < t K is the capital stock  used  at  t. 
Home TFP  t θ  is an exogenous random variable that follows an AR(1) process (see below). 
The law of motion of the Home capital stock is  1 (1 ) , tt t KK I δ + = −+  where01 δ ≤≤is a 
depreciation rate and  t I  is gross investment. Gross investment is generated using the final  
good. Let  () t I ξ  be the amount of the final good needed to generate , t I  with  () , tt II ξ ≥  
()0 ," ()0 . ' tt II ξ ξ >≥  The Home entrepreneur’s period t budget constraint is:  
           
1
11 (1 ) ( (1 ) ) ( ) ( )
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++ −+ − − + +=+ ,          (3)   
where  t L  is a one-period bank loan received by the Home entrepreneur in period t. 
01
L
t δ ≤≤  is an exogenous stochastic loan default rate: at t, the entrepreneur only pays 
back a fraction 1
L
t δ −  of the contracted amount  ,
L
tt LR  where 
L
t R  is the (contractual) 
gross loan rate between t-1 and t.
L
t R  is set at t-1, while 
L
t δ  is realized at t. In stochastic 
model simulations discussed below, we assume that the default rate is autocorrelated and 
that its innovations are correlated with innovations to total factor productivity (according 
to empirical estimates). 
 
E
t d  is the entrepreneur’s dividend income at t. The entrepreneur consumes her 
dividend income. Her expected lifetime utility at t is 
0 () ,
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∞
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E σ >  (when  1, σ
Ε=  we set  () l n () x x ν = ). Maximization of that 
life-time utility subject to (3) yields these first-order conditions:  
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where  1 '( (1 ) ) tt t qK K ξ δ + ≡− −  is the marginal cost of gross investment at date t.  
 
The global bank 
In period t, the global bank receives deposits 1 t D +  and 
*
1 t D +  from the Home and Foreign 
workers, respectively, and makes loans  1 t L +  and 
*









ttt LLL + ++ ≡+be worldwide stocks of deposits and 
loans at the end of period t. The bank faces a capital requirement: her date t capital 
11
WW
tt LD ++ −  should not be smaller than a fraction γ  of the bank’s assets  1.
W
t L + One may view 
this as a legal requirement, or as an implicit requirement reflecting market pressures.
12 
  We assume that the bank can hold less capital than the required level, but that this 
is costly (e.g., because the bank then has to engage in creative accounting). Let 
                                                 
12 We take the capital requirement as given, and focus on its macroeconomic effects. A large literature 
discusses micro-economic justifications for bank capital requirements (see Freixas and Rochet (2008)). That 
literature stresses that bank capital requirements can reflect market pressures. Essentially, capital require-
ments help ensure that the banker acts in the interest of her creditors. A simple story, in the spirit of Kiyotaki 
and Moore (2005), is that the banker can walk away with a fraction γ of the bank’s assets without pro- 
secution (and start a new life next period). Incentive compatibility then requires that the banker’s own funds 
(invested in the bank) may not fall below the assets with which the banker can abscond:  11 1 .
WWW
tt t LD L γ ++ + −≥      8
11 1 ()
WW W
tt t t xLD L γ ++ + ≡−− = 11 (1 )
WW
tt LD γ ++ −−  denote the bank’s ‘excess’ capital at the end of 
period  t. The bank bears a cost  () t x φ  as a function of  . t x   φ   is a convex function 
(' ' 0 ) φ ≥  for which we assume:  ()0 t x φ >  for 0 t x < ;  (0) 0. φ =   Thus, for  0 t x <  the bank 
incurs a positive cost. The cost is zero when the bank meets its capital requirement.
13 At 
time  t, the bank also bears an operating cost  11 (,)
WW
tt DL ++ Γ = 11
WW
Dt L t D L ++ Γ+ Γ  that is 
increasing and linear in deposits and loans, i.e.  ,0 DL Γ Γ> (we assume that marginal 
operating costs are time-invariant). The bank’s period t budget constraint is: 
   
** *
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where 
B
t d  is the profit (dividend) generated by the bank at t. 
L
t R  and 
*L
t R  are the gross  
interest rates between t-1 and t on loans made to the Home and Foreign entrepreneurs, 
respectively (Home and Foreign loan rates differ as loan default rates differ across 
countries). The banker does not have access to other assets, and thus she consumes her 
dividends. Her expected life-time utility at t is: 
0 ()
sB
tt s s Eu d β
∞
+ = ∑ .The banker 
maximizes life-time utility subject to (5). Ruling out Ponzi schemes, that problem has 
these first-order conditions: 
                                              11 '( )/ '( ) 1 '
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tt t t D t R E ud ud β φ ++= −Γ +                                    (6) 
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with  11 '' ( ( 1 ) )
WW
tt t LD φφ γ + + ≡− − . By accepting more deposits at t, the banker can increase her 
date t consumption, at the cost of a reduction of consumption at t+1. Specifically, when 
the bank raises deposits  1
W
t D +  by 1 unit (holding constant loans), she incurs a marginal 
operating cost  , D Γ  and her (excess) capital falls by one unit. Hence, the banker’s 
marginal benefit of deposits (in utility terms) is  '( ){1 '}.
S
tD t ud φ −Γ +  The discounted 
expected marginal cost of deposits to the bank is  11 1 '( )
DB
tt t RE u d β + ++ . At a maximum of the 
bank’s decision problem, the expected marginal benefit equals the marginal cost (see eq. 
(6)). If the bank raises Home loans by one unit at t (holding constant deposits), then this 
lowers her date t dividend by 1( 1 ) ' . L t γ φ +Γ + − The bank’s effective (gross) real rate of 
return on loans to the Home entrepreneur is thus  11 (1 )/{1 (1 ) ' },
LL
tt L t R δ γφ ++ −+ Γ + − which 
explains the Euler equation (7) (the same logic explains (8), which together with equation 
(7) implies a no-arbitrage condition between the effective return on loans to entrepreneurs 
in both countries; see below).  
 
Market clearing, definition of GDP  
Market clearing for the final good requires: 
     
** * *
11 1 1 () () ( , ) ( ( 1 ) )
EE B W W W W
tt tt t t t t t tt t t Z ZCCdd d I I DL L D ξξ φ γ + ++ + +=+++ ++ + + Γ + −− .    (9) 
                                                 
13 de  Walque  et  al.  (2009),  Gerali  et  al.  (2010) and Roeger  (2009)  assume  a  quadratic  cost  function 
2 1
2 () () , tt x x φχ = under which the bank also bears a cost when  0. t x > This function satisfies our assumptions. 
Our setup is more general, as it is allows for the possibility that positive excess capital generates a 
convenience yield(()0 t x φ <  for  0 t x > ). Up to a linear approximation (around x=0) both specifications yield 
the same predictions (in particular, the loan spread is decreasing in t x  if and only if  ''(0) 0; φ >  see below).   9
We assume that the bank purchases the resources that are necessary for Home deposits 
and Home lending,  11 (,) , tt DL ++ Γ  from the Home final good producer, and that 50% of the 
resource cost  () t x φ  is borne in Home final good units. As Γ  and φ  are physical inputs 
used by the banking firm, they have to be subtracted from final good production when 
computing GDP. Hence, Home GDP, denoted by  , t Y  is: 
                                1
11 1 1 2 (,) (( 1 ) )
WW
tt t t t t YZ DL L D φγ + ++ + =− Γ − − − .                                  (10) 
This definition of GDP ensures that world GDP equals world consumption (by all agents) 
plus world physical investment. Our calibration (see below) uses an investment cost 
function ξ  such that  ( ) tt I I ξ ≅  holds up to a first order approximation. Hence, the final 
good market clearing condition (9), and (10) (and the counterpart of (10) for the Foreign 
country) imply, up to first order: 
** * * .
EE B
tt t t t t t tt YY CC d d d I I + =+++ ++ + 
 
3.2. Discussion 
Loan rate spreads and bank capital 
As deposits provide liquidity services to workers, and as financial intermediation is 
costly, the deposit rate is lower than the loan rate. Let  k
11 1 (1 )
L LL
tt tt RR Eδ + ++ ≡−  and 
k ** *
11 1 (1 )
L LL
tt tt RR Eδ ++ + ≡−  be the expected effective gross interest rates (i.e. loan rates, net of the 
expected default rate) on loans to the Home entrepreneur and to the Foreign entrepreneur, 
respectively. Up to a certainty-equivalent approximation, the bank’s Euler equations (7)-
(8) imply  kk *
11
L L
tt RR ++ = , i.e. that expected effective loan rates are equated across 
countries.
14 Furthermore (from (6) and (7)):  k
11 /{ 1 ( 1 ) } / { 1 } 0 ' '
LD
tt L t D t RR γφ φ ++ ≅ +Γ + − −Γ + > , 
which implies that approximately:   
                                          k
11 (0) (0) '' '
LD
tt D L t RR x γφ γφ ++ −≅ Γ + Γ − − ⋅ ,                                (11) 
where a linear approximation of  () ' t x φ  around  0 t x =  was used,  () ( 0 ) ( 0 ) '' ' ' tt x x φ φφ ≅+ ⋅  
(below, we assume that excess bank capital is zero in steady state). Hence, a rise in 
excess bank capital  11 (1 )
WW
tt t x LD γ ++ ≡− −  lowers the (effective) loan rate spread  k
11
L D
tt RR ++ −  
when the cost of excess capital is strictly convex,  0. '' φ >  
  Up to a certainty-equivalent (linear) approximation, the bank’s supply of loans 








tt RR + +  per se (see Euler equations 




tt tt EE δ δ + +   have no effect on  k
1
L
t R +  
--and no effect on consumption, output, loans or deposits; such shocks only affect the 
contractual loan rates (when the expected Home default rate rises by 1 percentage point, 
the Home contractual loan rate  1
L
t R +  rises by approximately 1 percentage point as well, so 
                                                 




tt RR + +  differ across countries, when expected default rates 
differ across countries. Contractual loan rates, and spreads between those rates and deposit rates, are highly 




t R +  remains unchanged). Only unanticipated default rate changes induce wealth 
transfers between entrepreneurs and banks, and affect the real economy.
15  
  An unanticipated increase in the date t Home loan default rate brings about a 
wealth transfer from the bank to the Home entrepreneur. This lowers the bank’s capital. 
As shown below, the wealth transfer can have a sizable negative effect on world output, 
when  '' 0, φ >  as the shock then raises the effective loan rate spread  k
11
L D
tt RR ++ −  in both 
countries, by the same amount (due to the no-arbitrage condition  k k *
11
L L
tt RR + + = ).  
  To provide intuition for this effect, we now analyze in greater detail the 
optimizing behavior of the bank, for the special case where the bank has log utility(1 ) σ= . 
Up to a first-order approximation of the banker’s decision rule (around a deterministic 
steady state), her optimal date t consumption then equals a fraction 1 β −  of her 
beginning-of-period (net) wealth:  
                              
** * (1 ){ (1 ) (1 ) }
BL L L L W D
tt t t t t t t t dL R L RD R βδ δ =− − + − − .                    (12) 
Let                             11 1 1 1 1 1 (,) (( 1 ) )
WW W W W W
tt t t t t t A LD D L L D φγ ++ + + + + + ≡−+ Γ + − −                          (13) 
be the bank’s end-of-period t wealth, plus the costs incurred by the bank at t. Equation 
(12) and the bank budget constraint (5) imply that the bank optimally sets  1 t A +  at a 
fraction β  of her beginning-of period wealth:   
                                   
** *
1 {( 1 ) ( 1) } .
LL L L W D
tt t t t t t t t A LR LR D R βδ δ + =− + − −                          (14) 
Note that 1 t A +  and 
B
t d  fall in response to the bank’s unanticipated credit losses at date t, 
but are not affected by unanticipated date t TFP changes.
16 
  An unanticipated credit loss triggers a fall in the bank’s end-of-period wealth (by 
a fractionβ  of the credit loss) that is much larger than the reduction in her consumption 
(fraction 1 β −  of the loss). To understand why this matters for aggregate real activity 
when  '' 0 φ > , recall that then the loan spread  k
11
L D
tt RR + + −  is a decreasing function of excess 
bank capital  11 (1 )
WW
tt t x LD γ ++ ≡− − (see (11)). Up to a first-order approximation of (13) we 
have  11 1
WW D
tt t A LDR β ++ + =− ; here (and in what follows) variables without time subscripts 
denote (deterministic) steady state values.
17 Thus, 
                                               11 (1 ) (1 ) 1 ()
DW
tt t x AR D γβ γ + + =− + − − .                                   (15) 
The simulation below sets  0.05 γ =  and  1
D R β ≅  so that  11 0.95 0.05
W
tt t x AD ++ ≅−. The 
model simulations show that  1 t A +  and  t x  are highly positively correlated. As an 
unanticipated credit loss at date t lowers the bank’s end-of-period wealth 1 t A + , it triggers 
                                                 
15 Up to a linear approximation, the bank/entrepreneurial budget constraints and Euler equations can be 
expressed in terms of  k
1
L
t R +  and of default rate innovations: ,1 ,
L L




tt tt E δ ε δδ − ≡−  Thus  k
1
L
t R +  and 
other date t controls (consumption, hours, output etc) can be solved for as functions of date t predetermined 
variables, of date t TFP, and of default rate innovations 
*
,, , tt δ δ ε ε . Expected future default rates (and the 
serial correlation of default) thus do not matter for the behavior of effective loan rates and real activity.  
16 Loans and deposits held at the beginning of period t
* (,, )
W
tt t LLD  and the interest rates
* ,,
L LD
tt t RR R are set 
in t-1, which implies that the right-hand sides of (12) and (14) do not respond to date t TFP innovations. 
17 A linear approximation of (13) around steady state values gives 11 1 (1 (1 ) ') (1 ')
WW
tt L t D AL D γφ φ ++ + = +Γ + − − −Γ + =  
11,
WW D
tt LDR β ++ −  as  j 1( 1 ) ' LL R β γφ =+Γ + − ,  j 1 L R β =  and 1'
D
D R βφ = −Γ +  (from (4),(6),(7)).    11
a fall in excess bank capital  t x , which raises the loan spread, when  '' 0. φ >  The financial 
friction thus becomes more severe when an unanticipated credit loss occurs.  
 An  unanticipated Home TFP shock in period t raises the Home worker’s wage 
income and thus increases her holdings of deposits. As shown above, on impact, the 
shock has no effect on the banker’s end-of-period wealth,  1; t A +  however, due to the 
increase in deposits  1,
W
t D +  it lowers the bank’s excess capital (see (15)), which raises the 
loan spread, if  "0 . φ >  As shown below, this dampens the positive effect of the 
productivity shock on investment and output. The effects of a productivity shock are thus 
mitigated relative to a situation without an operative bank capital requirement (' '0 ) . φ =   
 
3.3 Calibration 
Final good technology, capital accumulation 
The elasticity of final good output with respect to capital is set at α=0.3, consistent with 
the capital share of roughly 30% observed in the US and EA. One period represents one 
quarter in calendar time. Accordingly, we set the depreciation rate of physical capital at 
δ=0.025, a commonly used value in quarterly macro models and consistent with the 
empirical estimates of that parameter provided by, e.g., Christiano and Eichenbaum 
(1992). We solve the model using a linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions. 
Hence, we have to calibrate the first and second derivatives of the investment cost 
function at the steady state value of investment. We assume that  '( ) 1, I ξ =  where IK δ =  
is (Home) steady state investment. In each model variant considered below, we set  ''( ) I ξ  
at the value for which, in stochastic simulations with all simultaneous shocks, the 
predicted ‘relative volatility’ of investment (ratio of the standard deviations of investment 
to the standard deviation of GDP) is 3.34 in each country.
18 This corresponds to the mean 
value of US and EA relative quarterly investment volatility during the period 1995q1-
2010q1.  
 
Bank and preference parameters 
The required bank capital ratio is set at  0.05. γ=  Empirically, the capital ratios of the 
major EA banks and of major US investment banks (i.e., ratios of bank equity to total 
(non risk-weighted) assets) have typically ranged between 3% and 5% in the period 
1995-2010, while the capital ratios of US commercial banks have generally been in the 
range of 7%-8%; see, e.g., D’Hulster (2009) and ECB (2010).
19 Below, we provide a 
sensitivity analysis with respect to  . γ  
  We set the steady state loan default rate at 0.95% per annum, which corresponds 
to the average US and EA loan loss rate in 1995-2010 (see Figure 2). Note that, in the 
model, the steady state default rate does not affect real activity. The steady state deposit 
rate and effective loan rate (net of default) are set at 1% and 2.5% per annum, 
respectively, which implies a steady state observed (contractual) loan rate of 3.48% p.a. 
Thus, the steady state loan-deposit spread is 2.48% p.a., which matches the average of 
US and EA loan spreads during the past decade. 
                                                 
18 When the investment cost function is linear (' ' ( )0 ) I ξ = then gross investment in a given country is 
excessively volatile, compared to the data. Setting  ''( ) 0 I ξ >  lowers the predicted volatility of investment.  
19 As discussed by D’Hulster (2009), p.2, US regulation prescribes a minimum bank capital ratio of 3% for 
banks rated ’strong’ and 4% for all other banks.  " Banks' actual leverage ratios are typically higher than the 
minimum, however, because banks are also subject to prompt corrective action rules requiring them to 
maintain a minimum leverage ratio of 5% to be considered ’well capitalized’ ".   12
  We thus set the (quarterly) subjective discount factor at  0.9938 β=  (as  j 1,
L R β =  
from the Home entrepreneur’s Euler equation (4)). The bank’s Euler equations (6) and (7) 
imply  1 '
D
D R β φ =− Γ+  and  j 1( 1 ) . '
L
L R β γφ =+ Γ+ −  Any combination of   ,, ' DL φ ΓΓ  
consistent with these conditions generates the same deterministic steady state, and the 
same first-order dynamics of endogenous variables.  
  The baseline calibration assumes that workers and bankers have log utility,  1. σ=  
We assume that entrepreneurs are less risk averse, and set  0.01
E σ =  (i.e. entrepreneurs 
are almost risk neutral). This implies that entrepreneurial consumption is more volatile 
than aggregate consumption, which is consistent with the data.
20  
  We assume that excess bank capital is zero in steady state, (1 ) ,
WW LD γ −=  and set 
the loans to physical capital ratio at 1/3: 
** // 1 / 3 . LK L K ==  This pins down the workers’ 
preference parameters  ,
DN ΨΨ .
21 The calibration entails that the ratio of loans to annual 
GDP is 81% in steady state. Empirically, the mean ratio of bank loans to non-financial 
businesses divided by annual GDP was about 45% in the US, and 90% in the EA, during 
the past decade. The steady state ratio in the model lies between these empirical ratios.
22 
  Finally, we have to calibrate the curvature of the cost of excess bank capital,  
(0). '' φ  We estimate  (0) '' φ  from (11), using aggregate US and EA loan and deposits as a 
proxy for world-wide loans and deposits. As shown in the Appendix, there is a strong 
negative correlation between 11 (1 )
WW
tt LD γ ++ −−  and the loan spread, which suggests that 
''(0) 0 φ >  holds empirically.
23 We argue in the Appendix that  (0) '' φ , multiplied by steady 
state quarterly world GDP, is in the range of 0.25. In the calibration, we thus set 
''(0) 0.25/ ,
W Y φ =  where 
*.
W YY Y ≡+  This calibration implies that a reduction in the bank 
capital ratio by 1 percentage point (e.g., from 5% to 4%) raises the loan spread by 16 
basis points per annum. 
24 
                                                 
20 Empirically, entrepreneurs are wealthier than the rest of the population; there is much evidence that the 
consumption of the wealthy is more volatile than aggregate consumption. See Parker and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2009) for evidence based on the US Consumer Expenditure Survey. Ait-Sahalia et al. (2004) 
document that sales of high-end luxury goods are an order of magnitude more volatile than aggregate 
consumption. Although, in our calibration, the banker is more risk-averse than the entrepreneurs, the 
banker's consumption fluctuates more than entrepreneurs' consumption (relative to steady state), in 
response to big credit losses, of the magnitude observed in 2007-09.   
21 0.014,
D Ψ=
N=2.478/Y. Ψ  The value of 
N Ψ  which delivers the targeted ratios  /, /
WW LKL D  depends on 
steady state GDP (Y). 
N Ψ  affects the scale of hours worked, output etc. but does not affect the dynamics. 
22 In steady state, the ratio of the capital stock to annual GDP is 2.41, while the consumptions of the 
worker, the banker and the entrepreneur represent 71.56%, 0.11% and 4.01% of GDP, respectively.  
23 Our findings here are consistent with Hubbard et al. (2002), and Santos and Winton (2009) who provide 
micro evidence that individual banks with higher capital charge lower loan spreads.  
24 A referee suggested that the relationship between the lending spread  k
11
L D
tt RR + + − and excess bank capital  t x  
might have important non-linearities which would be lost by linearizing the model. To empirically test for 
non-linearities, we regressed  k
11
L D
tt RR ++ −  on  t x  and the square of t x , using the empirical measures described 
in the Appendix.  
2 () t x  is not significant in any of the regressions (while the linear term  t x  is highly 
significant). Hubbard et al. (2002) likewise find no significant non-linearities in the relation between loan 
spreads and bank capital. Thus it seems reasonable to use a linear approximation of the relation between the 
spread and excess bank capital. We did, however, compute second-order accurate model solutions, for a 
range of values of ''' φ  (curvature of  ') φ , and found that they closely resemble the linearized solutions.    13
Forcing variables 
The theoretical unconditional business cycle statistics reported below are generated under 
the assumption that Home and Foreign TFP and credit loss rates follow univariate AR(1) 
processes, whose parameters were estimated using quarterly US and EA data for 1993q1-
2010q1 (this is the longest period for which we could find credit loss data for both the US 
and the EA).  
  Home and Foreign TFP are assumed to follow the processes: 
1, ln ln tt t θ θ θ ρθε − =+ and 
** *
1, ln ln , tt t θ θ θ ρθε − =+  respectively, where  ,t θ ε  and 
*
,t θ ε  are 
correlated white noises. In our data, the autocorrelations of linearly detrended US and EA 
log TFP both equal 0.95. We thus set  0.95 θ ρ = . The standard deviation of linearly 
detrended US (EA) log TFP is 1.73% (1.67%). To match that unconditional standard 
deviation, we set 
2* 2 2
,, () ()( 0 . 0 0 5 3 ) . tt EE θθ εε ==  These or very similar laws of motion for 
TFP are widely used in the RBC literature; see, e.g., King and Rebelo (1999). The 
correlation between linearly detrended log TFP in the US and EA was 0.82 during 
1993q1-2010q1. To match this fact, we set the correlation between  ,t θ ε  and 
*
,t θ ε  at 0.82.  
  When computing predicted unconditional model statistics, we assume that Home 
and Foreign credit loss rates follow the processes  1, (1 )
LL L
tt t δ δδ δ ρδ ρ δ ε − = −++  and 
** *
1, (1 ) ,
LL L
tt t δδ δ δ ρδ ρ δ ε − =− + +  respectively. The auto-correlations of credit loss rates in our 
sample period are 0.98 (US) and 0.96 (EA). The standard deviations of these rates are 
0.14% (US) and 0.085% (EA). We set  0.97 δ ρ =  and 
2* 2 2
,, ( ) ( ) (0.000282) . tt EE δδ εε ==  
This calibration implies an unconditional standard deviation of the default rate of 
0.116%, which is half-way between the empirical standard deviations of US and EA 
default rates. The empirical correlation between US and EA credit loss rates is 0.76; we 
thus set 
*
,, (,) 0 . 7 6 . tt Corr δδ εε=  US and EA default rates exhibit correlations in the range 
of -0.6 with linearly detrended log TFP in the same country and in the other country; the 
median correlation is -0.63. To match this, we set 
*
,, ,, (,) (,) tt tt Corr Corr δθ δθ εε εε ==  
** *
,, ,, ( , ) ( , ) 0.63. tt tt Corr Corr δθ δθ εε εε == −   
  As pointed out above, only unanticipated shocks to the default rate matter for real 
activity. Hence, the variance of real activity induced by credit losses only depends on 
2
, () t E δ ε  and 
*2
, () . t E δ ε  The persistence of default merely matters for the behavior of the 




tt RR ++ it is irrelevant for the behavior of the expected effective 
loan rate  k
11 1 (1 ),
LL L
tt tt RR Eδ ++ + =−  and for real activity. 
 
4. Quantitative Results 
4.1. Impulse responses 
We now discuss dynamic responses to innovations to Home TFP and to the Home credit 
loss rate. In each case, we focus on an isolated innovation, assuming that all other 
exogenous innovations are zero. 
 
Effects of a TFP shock 
The solid lines in Figure 3 represent responses to a 1% innovation to Home TFP in the 
baseline version of the model. The dashed lines represent responses to the same shock in 
a variant of the model where the marginal cost of violating the capital requirement is   14
constant, i.e.  '' 0. φ =
25 In accordance with the fitted AR(1) processes discussed above, 
we assume that after the innovation Home TFP decays at a rate of 95% per period 
(Foreign TFP is unaffected by the shock). In the Figure, the responses of interest rates 
and of the loan rate spread are expressed in percentage points per annum. The responses 
of all other variables are expressed as percentages of their respective steady state values. 
  Figure 3 shows that the responses of Home and Foreign GDP, aggregate 
consumption, and investment to the Home TFP shock are very similar across the two 
model variants.
26 Thus, the convex cost of violating the bank capital constraint does not 
significantly alter the effect of the TFP shock on real activity. In the baseline structure, 
the 1% shock to Home TFP raises Home GDP, aggregate consumption, and investment 
by 1.87%, 0.59% and 7.75% on impact, respectively. The corresponding responses in the 
model variant with  '' 0 φ =  are 1.91%, 0.60% and 7.91%, respectively. Home bank loans 
and deposits rise under both variants (by about 0.4% and 0.3% on impact). The strong 
rise in Home investment is accompanied by a brief fall in Home net exports (in the first 
three periods). 
  Foreign real activity responds much less strongly to the Home TFP shock than 
Home activity. As in standard International Real Business Cycle models with complete 
financial markets (e.g., Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992), Kollmann (1996) or 
Coeurdacier, Kollmann and Martin (2010)), a Home TFP increase lowers Foreign 
investment. This is due to the fact that the Home investment boom triggers a rise in the 
loan rate. Foreign aggregate consumption falls somewhat on impact (-0.05%), and rises 
thereafter slightly above its unshocked path. Foreign GDP rises very slightly on impact, 
but falls afterwards below its unshocked path (-0.15%, four periods after the shock).
27 
  The Home TFP shock raises the Home worker's labor income. As Home TFP 
decays gradually after the shock, the rise in Home labor income is temporary. Thus, the 
Home worker saves more, i.e., her bank deposit increases. On impact, world-wide bank 
deposits and loans rise by 0.145% and 0.137%, respectively, in the baseline model with 
'' 0. φ >  As deposits rise (slightly) more strongly than loans, the bank’s capital ratio falls 
by 0.15%, and the bank’s excess capital  t x  falls too (by 0.006% of annual world GDP).
28 
  The simulations thus confirm the analytical result derived above that a positive 
TFP shock lowers the bank's excess capital, on impact. In fact, the simulation shows that 
the fall in bank capital is quite persistent. (Bank capital falls somewhat more in the model 
variant with  '' 0, φ =  than in the baseline variant.)  
  The loan spread is (essentially) unaffected by the TFP shock when  '' 0, φ =  as the 
marginal cost of violating the capital requirement is constant in this case. By contrast, the 
loan spread rises in the baseline model variant. However, this effect is modest, due to the 
weak fall in the bank capital ratio and the low sensitivity of the spread to the capital ratio 
                                                 
25 In this case, temporary shocks have permanent effects on bank capital. The results reported here are 
indistinguishable from predictions that obtain when  '' φ  is set at a very small positive value 
5 (' '1 0) φ
− = , 
which ensures stationarity.  
26 We assume that 50% of the banker's consumption is realized in the Home country; thus Home (Foreign) 








tt t Cd d ++  
27 Consumption of the Foreign worker and entrepreneur fall initially (by -0.01% and -0.67%, respectively), 
while the banker’s consumption is initially unaffected. Consumption by these agents then rises above 
unshocked values.  
28 The bank capital ratio  11 1 () /
WW W
tt t t cap L D L ++ + ≡−  is increasing in excess capital  11 (1 )
WW
tt t x LD γ ++ ≡− −, to first 
order, as  ()
W
tt xL c a pγ ≅− .    15
(see above): on impact the spread rises merely by one basis point (bp); four quarters after 
the shock, the spread goes up by five bp. This muted response of the spread explains why 
the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to the TFP shock are similar across the two 
model variants. But note that Home GDP, consumption, and investment rise slightly less 
in the baseline model (because lending to the Home entrepreneur rises less strongly). 
Hence, the presence of the bank capital constraint dampens somewhat the response of 
Home GDP to a Home TFP shock. 
 
Effects of a credit loss shock 
Figure 4 shows dynamic responses to a one-time unexpected increase in the Home credit 
loss rate worth 5% of steady state annual Home GDP, while there are no innovations to 
the other shock processes (one period after the shock, the loss rate returns to its steady 
state value). This experiment is meant to capture the exceptional events of 2007-2009: the 
shock roughly corresponds to the observed credit losses originating in the US during that 
period (see Section 2).
 29 An alternative crisis scenario (with a gradual rise in the default 
rate) is discussed below.   
  In the baseline model with an operative bank capital requirement (' '0 ) , φ >  the 
shock triggers a sizeable fall in GDP and investment in both countries. During the first 
year after the shock, Home and Foreign GDP both drop by about 1.95%. The fall in GDP 
is persistent: 8 quarters after the credit loss, Home and Foreign GDP are still about 1.2% 
below their unshocked values. By contrast, in the model variant without an operative 
bank capital constraint (' '0 ) , φ =  the Home credit loss only has a minor effect on GDP 
(Home GDP rises by 0.02%, while Foreign GDP falls by 0.02%). 
  In both model variants, the Home credit loss lowers the bank's capital ratio by 
57% on impact. In the baseline model, the bank capital ratio then slowly reverts to its pre-
shock level. 20 quarters after the shock, the bank capital ratio remains 21% below its 
unshocked value. By contrast, the fall in the bank capital ratio is permanent in the model 
variant with  '' 0 φ =  (no reversion to pre-shock value). 
  In the baseline model, the fall in bank capital leads to a sizeable and persistent rise 
in the loan-deposit spread (+50 basis points on impact).
30 There is a sizeable and persistent 
fall in the deposit rate (on impact: -55 bp; after 20 quarters: -14 bp); the loan rate falls 
slightly on impact (-5 bp), before rising above its pre-shock value. The rise in the loan 
spread (observed in the baseline model) is accompanied by a fall in loans, deposits, 
investment, and aggregate consumption in both countries.
31  In contrast, loan and deposit  
                                                 
29 Figure 4 thus does not use the fitted AR(1) credit loss process described in Sect.3.3. The fitted process is 
used below in simulations designed to quantify the role of default shocks for conventional business cycles. 
30 As Figure 4 considers a one-time increase in the Home loan default rate, the expected future default rate 
is unaffected; the effective (expected) Home interest rate spread  k
11
L D
tt RR + + −  thus shows the same response  as 
the contractual (observed) spread  11 .
L D
tt RR ++ −  
31 The banker's consumption falls sharply, on impact (-57%). By contrast, Home and Foreign workers’ 
consumption rises (the strong and persistent reduction in the deposit rate induces workers to save less). The 
consumption of Home and Foreign entrepreneurs falls too on impact (-20%), due to the rise in the (future) 
loan rate, and the high intertemporal elasticity of substitution of entrepreneurs. But the Home entrepreneur's 
life-time utility increases, as her consumption rises sufficiently in later periods. (If entrepreneurs were as 
risk averse as workers, then the Home entrepreneur’s consumption would rise on impact, and total Home 
consumption would rise too; however, Home and Foreign output would continue to fall significantly, as in 
the baseline calibration.) The positive welfare effect (for the entrepreneur) is an implication of considering 
a default shock in isolation. In reality, default is negatively correlated with TFP, and thus entrepreneurs are 
typically worse off when default rates are high (than in times of low default).    16
rates are unaffected by the credit loss shock in the model variant with  '' 0; φ =  in that 
variant, the consumption of the Home entrepreneur rises slightly, while the consumption of 
the banker falls; aggregate Home consumption and investment are essentially unaffected.  
  The experiment in Figure 4 assumes an unanticipated one-time rise in the loan 
default rate. Yet, actual loan losses rose gradually over the period 2007-2009, as shown in 
Fig.2. It seems plausible that, once the crisis had started, some of the subsequent losses were 
anticipated. In our model (with one-period loans), anticipated defaults are fully reflected 
in the contractual loan rate and thus leave bank capital unaffected. However, to the extent 
that, in reality, loan contracts have a multi-period maturity, and that loan rates are not 
renegotiated on a period-by-period basis, bank capital is likely to have suffered from 
these anticipated loan losses after the onset of the crisis. In order to capture this notion, 
Figure 5 shows results obtained from assuming an anticipated multi-period transfer from 
the global bank to the Home entrepreneur. The transfer is zero at t=0, but agents learn at 
t=0 that the transfer will be positive and rising for the next 4 periods, before it declines. The 
lower right panel of Figure 5 shows the trajectory of the transfer (expressed in percentage 
points of Home steady state annual GDP), which resembles the (actual and projected) US 
credit losses reported in IMF (2010). The transfer totals 5% of steady state annual Home 
GDP. Overall, the dynamic responses are similar to those reported in Figure 4 
(unanticipated credit loss), except that the adjustment dynamics of GDP is now hump-
shaped. Note also that output already declines at t=0, i.e. before the transfer materializes.  
  We also conduct a number of other experiments to explore the robustness of the 
results. First, as the parameter  ''(0) φ  plays an important role for the response to loan 
default shocks, we consider a model variant in which  ''(0) φ  is raised by a factor of ten, 
i.e. we now set  ''(0) 2.5/ .
W Y φ =  Figure 6 displays the impulse responses to an 
unanticipated one-time rise in the default rate worth 5% of annual Home GDP for this 
case (blue dashed lines) and contrasts it with the baseline calibration (red solid lines). 
When  ''(0) φ  is greater, the loan spread rises more strongly on impact; as deviations from 
the required bank capital ratio are more costly than in the baseline model, the bank capital 
ratio returns to its pre-shock value more rapidly. This induces a sharper initial recession, 
but a faster return to steady state levels.  
  Next, we consider a stricter bank capital requirement, and set the target value of 
the bank capital ratio at  0.1 γ=  (twice the baseline value). The green dashed-dotted lines 
in Figure 6 show the responses to the one-time credit loss, for this case. Results are fairly 
similar to those of the baseline model. 
32  
 
4.2 Do the bank capital channel and loan default shocks matter under normal 
economic conditions?  
The preceding results suggest that shocks affecting bank capital are key to understanding 
the 2007-2009 recession. However, the bank capital channel may not matter greatly for 
conventional business cycles. Table 2 reports unconditional business cycle statistics 
generated by the model, using the fitted AR(1) processes for TFP and loan losses 
reported in Section 3.3. Note that Table 2 thus assumes an (estimated) standard deviation 
of the innovations to the quarterly credit loss rate of 0.0282%, which is much smaller 
than the loss rates observed in 2007-2009. As for the empirical statistics in Table 1, the 
                                                 
32  We also relaxed the assumption that the elasticity parameter of the worker’s (sub-) utility of deposits 
equals the worker’s coefficient of relative risk aversion for consumption. Setting the elasticity parameter 
for deposits at values ranging between 0.5 and 2 does not significantly alter our findings.    17
theoretical statistics shown here are computed on HP-filtered variables (all variables, 
except the credit spread, are logged before applying the HP filter). 
  Table 2 compares the business cycle properties of the baseline model (Columns 1-
3) and those of the model variant without an operative bank capital constraint (Columns 
4-5 labeled ‘Model with  '' 0' φ = ) to (average) empirical statistics for the US and EA (last 
Column). In line with the impulse responses discussed above, we find that the bank 
capital constraint dampens the fluctuations of real activity induced by TFP shocks, and 
that it generates larger fluctuations of GDP in response to default shocks. However, 
quantitatively its effect on business cycle statistics is small. Note that the baseline model 
predicts that the standard deviation of GDP is 1.36% when there are only TFP shocks, 
0.02% with just loan default shocks, and 1.37% with both shocks simultaneously (see 
Columns 1-3). Without an operative bank capital constraint (' '0 ) φ = , the standard 
deviation of GDP is 1.41% with just TFP shocks, and 0.000073% with loan default 
shocks only (Column 5). Thus, loan loss shocks only have a negligible effect on the 
unconditional standard deviation of real activity. 
  The model generates a predicted volatility of GDP that is roughly in line with 
actual volatility (actual standard deviations of GDP: 1.12% (US), 1.42% (EA)). Like 
standard RBC models, the model here predicts that (aggregate) consumption is less 
volatile than GDP. Our model explains about a third of the actual volatility of the loan 
rate spread. It underpredicts the volatility of loans, but it generates a volatility of deposits  
that is close to the data. Furthermore, the model matches the fact that consumption and 
investment are highly correlated with domestic GDP. It also predicts that loans are more 
procyclical than deposits, which is consistent with the data. Interestingly, both model 
variants explain the fact that the credit spread is negatively correlated with GDP. This 
result is driven by the assumed negative correlation between TFP and the loan default 
rate; by contrast, the assumed negative correlation between TFP and credit loss 
innovations is of minor importance for the other moments, as those moments are 
essentially driven by TFP shocks. 
  In the baseline model, the standard deviation of entrepreneurs' consumption (not 
shown in Table) is 5% (i.e., 
E
t d  is about 8 times more volatile than aggregate 
consumption), while the consumption (dividend income) of the banker is roughly as 
volatile as aggregate consumption.
33 The main business cycle statistics are unaffected 
when we assume that the banker is less risk averse than in the baseline model. Setting the 
banker's coefficient of relative risk aversion at 0.1 (instead of 1) implies that the predicted 
standard deviation of her consumption equals that of entrepreneurs' consumption (5%). 
However, the predicted standard deviations of GDP (1.38%) and of the loan rate spread 
are essentially unaffected compared to the baseline model. 
  The model matches the fact that output, consumption, investment, deposits, loans, 
loan rates and loan spreads are highly positively correlated across countries. This reflects 
our assumption that shocks are highly positively correlated across countries. In the set-up 
here, country-specific technology shocks do not generate synchronized international 
output fluctuations, in line with similar findings for conventional multi-country models 
                                                 
33 High dividend volatility is a realistic feature of the model. For the US, the standard deviation of HP-
filtered (smoothing parameter: 400) log annual net real dividend payments made by the Finance and 
Insurance industry was 12.75% in 1998-2008, while the corresponding standard deviation for the aggregate 
net dividend payments made by other sectors was 9.75%. The actual standard deviations of quarterly 
logged and HP-filtered real corporate profits paid by the US financial sector was 16.63% during the period 
1995q1-2010q1. Corresponding statistic for the non-financial sector: 12.59%.   18
(e.g., Backus et al. 1992). In particular, setting the cross-country correlation of TFP to 
zero lowers the predicted cross-country output correlation to -0.05.  
  The irrelevance of the bank capital channel and of default shocks for business 
cycle statistics is robust to a range of parameter changes. For example, it continues to 
hold when the convexity of the bank's cost of excess capital is increased. Even when 
''(0) φ  is multiplied by a factor of 10, the predicted standard deviation of GDP remains 
very low when there are only default shocks (0.04%); the relative standard deviation of 
the loan rate spread (in % p.a.) also only rises slightly (to 0.12).  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have explored the macroeconomic consequences of a globally integrated 
banking sector, using a quantitative two-country business cycle model. In the model, 
cyclical fluctuations are the result of productivity and loan default shocks. We have 
calibrated the model using US and Euro Area data and shown that it delivers successful 
predictions for key business cycle statistics. Several key results emerge. First, a bank 
capital constraint hardly affects the international transmission of productivity shocks. 
Second, loan default shocks are of little consequence for conventional business cycles. 
However, the countercylical behavior of actual interest rate spreads can only be 
accounted for by the model when default shocks are assumed. Third, when subjected to a 
country-specific loan default shock of the size seen in the US during 2007-2009, the 
model predicts a global  recession. This prediction is noteworthy as the 2007-2009 
financial crisis was characterized by a synchronized fall in economic activity in both the 
US and the EA. Our results thus suggest that global banks may have played an important 
role in the international transmission of the 2007-2009 recession.  
  In order to highlight the role of the global financial sector for the international 
transmission of shocks, our analysis has abstracted from a number of issues which may 
also have played a quantitatively important role, in 2007-2009. Examples are oil and 
commodity price changes, the collapse of international trade, and the zero lower bound 
which constrained monetary policy. We leave an analysis of these issues, within our 
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APPENDIX 
A. Evidence on the sensitivity of credit spreads to excess bank capital 
In the model, the following relation holds between the expected effective loan spread  k
11
LD
tt R R ++ −  
and excess bank capital, 11 (1 )
WW
tt t x LD γ ++ ≡− − :   
                                             k
11 (0) (0) 0 '' '
LD
tt D L t RR x γφ γφ ++ −≅ Γ + Γ − − ⋅ > ,                                   (11) 
t x can be expressed as a weighted sum of the Home and Foreign loans/deposit ratios, which we 
denote as 
** *
11 1 11 1 /, /: tt t tt t LD LD λλ ++ + ++ + ≡≡  
                              m m ** *
11 1 1 1 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) tt t t t t t xL D L D L L γ γγ λ γ λ
∗
++ + + + + =− − +− −≅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ ,               (A1) 
where m
11 1 () / l n ( / ) tt t λ λλ λ λ λ ++ + ≡−≅  is the deviation of  1 t λ +  from its steady state value . λ  (To get 
(A1), we assume that steady state Home and Foreign loans and deposit verify  (1 ) , LD γ −=  
** (1 ) , LD γ −=  which follows from our assumption that countries are symmetric and that steady 
state excess bank capital is zero). To obtain estimates of  (0) '' φ  that do not depend on (arbitrary) 
normalizations (choices of units) for loans, we assume that  (0) / , ''
W Y φ ≡Φ with  
*,
W YY Y ≡+ for a 
constant Φ  (invariant to steady state world GDP 
W Y ). We can thus write (11) as:  
                                                    k
11 (0) '
LD
tt D L t R Rz γφ ++ − ≅Γ + Γ − −Φ⋅ ,                                       (A2) 
with  m m **
11 (1 ) { ( / ) (1 ) ( / ) } tt t zs L Y s L Y γ γλ λ
∗
++ ≡− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ − ⋅ ⋅  where 
* /( ) sYYY ≡ +  is the (steady state) share 
of Home GDP in world GDP.  
  We construct quarterly time series for  t z  (1999q1-2010q1), using logged series for ratios 
of (stocks of) loans to deposits in the US (country ‘Home’) and in the EA (country ‘Foreign’).
34 
To generate  t z , we set  0.05 γ =  (as in the model) and s=0.567 (sample average of the share of US 
GDP in US+EA GDP) and  /1 . 8 0 , LY=
** /3 . 6 0 LY=  (sample averages of the ratios of loans to 
quarterly GDP in the US and EA, respectively). Recall that the model predicts that Home and 
Foreign effective (expected) credit spreads are identical. We fit (A2) to a weighted average of US 
and EA credit spreads (using weights s=0.567 and 1-s respectively). Note that (A2) pertains to the 
effective (expected) credit spread,  k
11 1 (1 ).
LL L
tt t t RR E δ + ++ ≡−  We use two proxies for that effective (US 




tt R R + +  as proxies for 
the effective loan rate (thus assuming that the conditional expected future default rate is constant). 
The second measure uses a fitted (predicted) future default rate, based on a OLS regression of 
date t+1 default rates on date t default rates.  
  Note that (A2) implies that (effective) credit spread  k
11
LD
tt t R R ρ + + ≡− is perfectly negatively 
correlated with  . t z  It also implies that Φ  equals the negative of the ratio of standard deviations 
of  t ρ  and  : t z   () / () . tt std std z ρ Φ=−  The Table below reports the correlations between  t ρ  and  t z  
( (,) tt Corr z ρ ) and  () / () tt std std z ρ − . We also report an OLS estimate of Φ  based on a regression 
of  t ρ  and  t z  (n
,z ρ Φ ) as well as the inverse of an OLS estimate of the regression coefficient of  t z  
on  t ρ  (n
, z ρ Φ ). (The figures in parentheses are p-values.) The correlations between credit spreads 
and the measure of aggregate US-EA excess bank capital range between -0.55 and -0.40 and are 
                                                 
34 We use the 1999q1-2010q1 sample period, as EA loan spread series start in 1999q1. We construct  m
1 t λ +  
as  11 log( / ) tt LD ++ minus the sample average 
1
11 1 log( / ) tt
T TL D
−
+ + ∑   m *
1 ( t λ +  is defined analogously.)   20
highly statistically significant. The empirical estimates of Φ  range between 0.08 and 0.62; the 
mean and median estimates of Φ are 0.30 and 0.25, respectively. As discussed in the main text, 
our baseline calibration assumes  0.25. Φ=  
 
Estimates of  ''(0) φ  
                              (,) tt Corr z ρ          () / () tt std std z ρ           n
,z ρ Φ                     1/ n
, z ρ Φ  
First spread measure 
no filter               -0.55 (.00)                 0.34                   0.19 (.00)               0.62 (.00) 
HP filter              -0.75 (.00)                 0.28                   0.23 (.00)               0.41 (.00) 
 
Second spread measure 
no filter                -0.42 (.00)                 0.19                   0.08 (.00)               0.45 (.00) 




B. Data sources and definitions 
US data for GDP and its components are from BEA/NIPA (in billions of 2005 dollars). 
Investment is gross private fixed investment. Consumption is personal consumption expenditures. 
For the Euro Area (EA16: fixed composition) data are from the ECB: GDP, final consumption of 
households and non-profit institutions serving households, gross fixed capital formation. We 
compute deflators on the basis of nominal GDP. We use time series from the AWM database 
(Fagan et al., 2001) to construct a longer time series for EA output on the basis of growth rates. 
  US data for loan write-offs are from the Federal Reserve Board (charge-off and 
delinquency rates on loans and leases at all insured US-chartered commercial banks). As loan 
write-off data for EA are not available, we use German data as a proxy. Annual data for loan 
write-offs of German banks (in percent of total loans) are from IMF (2010); we interpolate 
quarterly observations using cubic splines. US data for bank equity/assets are from the FRED 
database (St. Louis Fed).  
  For the US, data on loans and deposits for all commercial banks are from the Federal 
Reserve Board (H.8 Table, May 28, 2010). For the EA, data on loans of MFIs to non-financial 
corporations and households, and deposits by non-financial corporations and households are from 
the ECB. We deflate the series with the GDP deflator. 
  Our measure for US interest rate spreads is from the Federal Reserve Board (survey of 
terms of business lending), capturing commercial and industrial loan rate spreads over the 
intended federal funds rate (all loans). For the EA, we construct a measure for the loan rate, 
drawing on ECB data (from July 2003 onwards: loans other than revolving loans and overdrafts, 
convenience and extended credit card debt, Over 1 and up to 5 years, Up to and including EUR 1 
million, new business) and Bundesbank (long term credit of firms: 500,000 to 5 Mio euro, 
effective rate, averages) to backtrack the EA series up to 1997. To obtain an EA interest rate 
spread measure comparable to the US spread, we subtract the EONIA rate (from ECB). 
  US stock market indices are from www.freelunch.com (S&P 500) and from Dow Jones. 
For the EA, data are from Euro Stoxx: Europe 600 and Europe 600 banks. 
  Our TFP measure is constructed using real GDP and total employment data from the 
Economic Outlook database of the OECD (assuming a 70% labor share, as in model).  
  For the US, annual net real dividend payments of the finance and insurance industry 
(aggregate net dividend payments of other sectors) and real corporate profits of the US financial 
sector (and the corresponding series for the non-financial sector) are from BEA/NIPA. (Quarterly 
series for dividends not available from this source.) 
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Table 1. Business cycle properties of US and Euro Area (EA) data  
                                                                          Correlations with         
                                 Standard deviations            domestic GDP           Cross-country     
                                    US           EA                   US           EA              correlations 
 
GDP 1.12  1.42  1.00  1.00  0.76 
Consumption 0.82  0.59  0.85  0.87  0.85 
Investment   4.18  2.50  0.94  0.94  0.79 
Employment 0.92  0.56  0.81  0.87  0.72 
Deposits 0.68  0.93  -0.28  -0.03  0.56 
Bank loans  2.43  1.63  0.51  0.83  0.78 
Loan spread  0.32  0.22  -0.14  -0.37  0.61 
 
Note.—The Table shows moments of HP-filtered quarterly empirical time series (smoothing 
parameter: 1600). Sample period: 1995q1-2010q1, except later starting dates for EA deposits 
(1997q3) and EA loan spreads (1999q1). All series are in real terms. Except for interest rate 
spreads, all series are logged before HP-filtering. The standard deviations of GDP are expressed 
in percent; standard deviations of the remaining variables are normalized by the standard dev. of 
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Table 2. Business cycle properties of theoretical economies    
                                                 Baseline model                Model with  '' 0 φ =                    
                                                       Shocks:                                Shocks:                      Data  
                                             All        TFP     default              All       TFP                (US &EA)   
                                          (1)           (2)           (3)                     (4)           (5)                       (6) 
 
Standard deviations (in%) 
GDP (Y) 1.37  1.36  0.02  1.41  1.41  1.27 
 
Relative standard deviations (std(x)/std(GDP)) 
Aggregate consumption  0.42  0.42  0.38  0.42  0.42  0.70 
Investment 3.34  3.39  3.59  3.34  3.34  3.34 
Hours 0.67  0.67  1.38  0.69  0.69  0.74 
Deposits 0.60  0.59  1.32  0.63  0.63  0.80 
Loans 0.61  0.60  2.14  0.63  0.63  2.03 
Loan rate spread  0.10  0.01  5.94  0.10  0.00  0.27 
 
Correlations with domestic GDP 
Aggregate consumption  0.78  0.79  0.55  0.78  0.78  0.86 
Investment 0.94  0.93  0.96  0.94  0.94  0.94 
Hours 0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.84 
Deposits 0.23  0.23  0.15  0.21  0.21  -0.15 
Loans 0.34  0.31  0.72  0.32  0.30  0.67 
Loan rate spread  -0.62  0.42  -0.93  -0.62  0.87  -0.25 
 
Cross country correlations 
GDP (Y) 0.79  0.79  1.00  0.81  0.81  0.76 
Aggregate consumption  0.89  0.89  0.99  0.89  0.89  0.85 
Investment 0.62  0.61  1.00  0.64  0.64  0.79 
Hours 0.79  0.78  1.00  0.82  0.82  0.72 
Deposits 0.73  0.72  1.00  0.77  0.77  0.56 
Loans 0.54  0.51  0.90  0.60  0.59  0.78 
Loan rate spread  0.77  1.00  0.77  0.75  1.00  0.61 
 
Note.—The Table shows theoretical moments and empirical moments of variables in a given country 
(standard deviations, correlations with domestic GDP) and cross-country correlations. The ‘loan rate 
spread’ is the difference between the loan rate (not net of expected default),  1
L
t R + , and the deposit rate, 
1,
D
t R +  in % per annum terms. Columns labeled ‘Shocks: All’, ‘Shocks: TFP’, ‘Shocks: default’ show 
model-generated statistics (with all simultaneous shocks; with just Home and Foreign TFP shocks; 
and with just H and F loan default rate shocks, respectively). The Column labeled ‘Data’ shows 
average empirical statistics for the US and EA (1995q1-2010q1), see Table 1 (the empirical ‘hours’ 
measure is employment). All statistics pertain to HP filtered variables; all variables except the loan 
rate spread were logged before applying the HP filter. 
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Figure 1: Cyclical component of GDP based on HP-ﬁltered series with smoothing parameter
of 1600 (left) and yoy-growth rates minus average growth (right). Sample: 1975q1–2010q1.
Solid lines: US, dashed lines: EA. Shaded areas: NBER recessions.Loan losses Bank capital ratio
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Figure 2: Financial data in the US and EA. Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions (latest
recession is assumed to have ended in 2009q2). Loan losses are writeoﬀs on loans measured
in percent of total loans (annualized). For loan losses we consider German data, as we lack
data for the EA aggregate. The bank capital ratio (equity/assets) is measured in percent.
Loan growth is measured on a yoy-basis. The interest rate spread is measured in annualized
percentage points. Stock market indices: 2009q1=100. A detailed description of the data is
provided in the appendix.GDP Aggregate consumption Investment
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Figure 3: Impulse-response functions to a TFP shock of 1% at Home. Notes: red solid lines
depict baseline case, blue dashed lines depict case of φ00(0) = 0. Variables are expressed in
percentage deviations from steady state, interest rates in percentage points.GDP Aggregate consumption Investment
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Figure 4: Impulse-response functions to a one-time increase in the Home default rate of 5%
of annual GDP. Notes: red solid lines depict baseline case, blue dashed lines depict case of
φ00(0) = 0. Variables are expressed in percentage deviations from steady state, interest rates
in percentage points.GDP Aggregate consumption Investment
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Figure 5: Impulse-response functions to an anticipated path of transfers to the entrepreneurs.
Notes: transfer from the bank to entrepreneurs at Home. Total size of transfer is 5% of steady-
state GDP. Red solid lines depict baseline case, blue dashed lines depict case of φ00(0) = 0.
Variables are expressed in percentage deviations from steady state, interest rates in percentage
points.GDP Consumption Investment
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Figure 6: Impulse-response functions to a one-time increase in the Home default rate of 5%
of annual GDP. Notes: red solid lines depict baseline case, blue dashed lines depict case of
φ00(0) = 2.5/Y W, green dashed-dotted lines show case of γ = 0.1. Variables are expressed in
percentage deviations from steady state, interest rates in percentage points.